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Abstract
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nd that
(1) the model may exhibit local indeterminacy and sunspots when tari¤ rates are endogenously
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sum tansfers); and (2) indeterminacy disappears if the government nances endogenous public
spending and transfers with xed tari¤ rates. Under the rst type of balanced budget formulation,
we provide numerical (calibration) examples to illustate that the government shouldnt distort
the oil price paid by rms with tari¤s in order to avoid aggregate instability. Under the second
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regardless of the existence of lump-sum transfers.
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1. Introduction
It is well understood by now that a standard neoclassical growth model with factor income taxes,
as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997, henceforth SGU), may possess an indeterminate steady state
and thus a continuum of perfect foresight equilibria.1 Unlike one-sector models with su¢ ciently
strong productive externalities, as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994), the
upward-sloping (equilibrium) labor demand curve needed for indeterminacy is due to the presence
of scal increasing returns caused by endogenous labor income tax rates. Specically, Guo and
Harrison (2004, henceforth GH) show that SGUs indeterminacy result depends on a balanced-
budget requirement whereby the tax rate decreases with the output and indeterminacy disappears
once the goverment nances endogenous public spending and transfers with xed income tax rates.
One common feature in those models is that self-fullling beliefs of agents can be an independent
shock to endogenous business cycles.2 In open economies, tari¤ as a tax on trade acts like a factor
income tax and we ask whether it generates indeterminacy in a similar way to factor income tax.
To address this question, we rst briey summarize the literature on trade taxes. It has been
known that the government can raise revenue by using the tari¤ instruments.3 Many authors, such
as Atolia (2006) and Leung (1999), point out that in an open economy model, public investment
or spending can be nanced by a tari¤ (and income tax). Ramseys (1927) analysis suggests that
tari¤ rates can be endogenized. Two examples are Loewy (2004) and Mourmouras (1991) who
use endogenous tari¤s in a two-country open economy endogenous growth model and a small open
economy OLG model respectively.
1 In a one-sector neoclassical growth model with factor income taxes, SGU show that the model can exhibit inde-
terminacy if taxes rates are endogenously determined by a balanced budget rule with a pre-set level of government
expenditures (or lump-sum transfers).
2See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for an excellent survey of the literature. In this paper, I use the terms "indeter-
minacy", "sunspots" and "self-fullling beliefs" interchangeably.
3The revenue motive behind the imposition of trade taxes is well documented. See, Kindleberger and Lindert (1978,
p. 143), and Riezman and Slemrod (1987).
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In this paper, we introduce government tari¤ policy into a one-sector small open economy that
imports energy (say, oil) and extend Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes analysis by considering di¤erent
balanced-budget rules whereby government expenditures and/or transfers can be nanced by the
energy tari¤ revenue.4 In particular, we consider a countercyclical (at) tari¤ policy whereby con-
stant (endogenous) government expenditures (or lump-sum transfers) are nanced by endogenous
(exogenous) tari¤ rates.5 It turns out that a countercyclical tari¤ policy is needed to generate inde-
terminacy in this model while a at tari¤ policy can make the economy immune to indeterminacy
regardless of the existence of lump-sum transfers. All of these results suggest that tari¤s generate
indeterminacy in a similar way to factor income taxes.6 Moreover, under the balanced-budget rule
with a countercyclical tari¤ policy, for empirically plausible values of steady state tari¤ rates (or
energy taxes), we provide calibration examples to illustate that the government shouldnt distort the
energy (oil) price paid by rms with tari¤s in order to avoid aggregate instability.
The intuition for how regressive tari¤s generate indeterminacy in the one-sector small open econ-
omy is tantamount to understanding how scal increasing returns arise. Suppose the proverbial
representative agent expects future tari¤ rates to increase. This implies, for any given stock of capi-
tal, future imports of foreign inputs and the marginal product of capital will be lower. It will lower
the current demand for foreign inputs, thus leading to a fall in total output. If the tari¤ rate is
regressive with respect to the output (under the balanced budget rule with a pre-set level of govern-
4For simplicity, we assume that the government doesnt impose consumption taxes on the tradable goods or factor
income taxes on the production factors. The tari¤ revenue in this model can also be interpreted as oil tax revenue.
Hence the implication of this model is not limited to open economies with trade taxes, which means that the main
result in this paper also applies to domestic energy taxes. The foreign input can also be interpreted as non-reproducible
natural resources extracted domestically.
5Under the balanced budget rule with a constant level of government expenditures (or lump-sum transfers), tari¤
rates are endogenously determined since the government is forced to lower the tari¤ rates as total output (or tax base)
rises. This means that the tari¤ rates are countercyclical.
6 In the two sector model without scal increasing returns induced by factor income taxes, Bond, Wang and Yip
(1996) and Meng and Velasco (2003) prove that distortionary factor taxation nonetheless causes indeterminacy in a
closed-economy, endogenous growth model and a small open RBC model respectively. Does the "channel equivalence"
between factor income taxes and tari¤s to generate indeterminacy still hold in a small open economy two sector model?
This is one issue which deserves further research.
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ment expenditures (or lump-sum transfers)), the tari¤ rate today will increase, thus validating the
agents initial expectations. By contrast, the above mechanism for indeterminacy is eliminated under
the balanced budget rule that consists of xed tari¤ rates and endogenous public spending. More
precisely, constant tari¤ rates together with diminishing marginal products of productive inputs will
reduce the higher anticipated returns from belief-driven labor and investment spurts, thus making
sunspot uctuations less likely to occur.
It turns out that in our benchmark model, under the assumption that government expenditures
are constant and labor is indivisible, we can explicitly derive the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the balanced budget rule to generate indeterminacy. It requires that the steady state tari¤ rate be
greater than the share ratio of capital and imported factors in production and less than the share ratio
of labor and imported factors in production. This result suggests that, in general, we should either
impose some restrictions on the government ability to adjust tari¤ rates or reduce the level of tari¤
rates levied on the imported factors in order to avoid aggregate instability. We consider the current
high tari¤ rate which is prevailing in European countries (especially in year 2002). Some countries like
Denmark and Netherlands, whose economies depend on the imported exhaustible natural resources,
can be easily pushed into destabilization.7 We use the Aguiar-Conraria and Wens (2005, 2007,
and 2008, henceforth ACW) estimation of the imported energy share in the two countries and nd
that the high tari¤ rate on oil in the EU leads the two countries into destabilization. Similarly, the
energy taxes which the EU countries have tried to impose recently also bring the potential dangers of
destabilization into those countries whose economies depend on non-reproducible resources. Those
countries like Denmark and Netherlands should pay close attention to the control of energy taxes in
order to stabilize the economy. As an optimal import tari¤, energy taxes seem to be very high in
these two countries (see Newbery (2005)).
7Although throughout the paper, we analyze the model for the developed countries, the result also holds for the
less-developed countries which productions are dependent on the imported factors.
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Similar issues have been explored by Miguel and Manzano (2006) in a small open economy that
imports oil. Unlike this paper, they assume that the government nances an exogenous ow of public
spending by using consumption and oil taxes (or tari¤s) and by issuing debt. Since the tari¤ rates
are exogenous in their model, indeterminacy can not arise. The main nding in their paper is that
the government should not distort the oil price paid by rms with taxes, even when consumption of
oil is considered and the government distinguishes between the taxes paid by the households and the
rms. That is due to the fact that the optimal tax on intermediate goods (such as oil) should be zero
in order to maintain aggregate production e¢ ciency. This paper conrms their point of view from
another perspective. That is, in order to avoid aggregate instability caused by endogenous tari¤s,
the government should not distort the energy price.
To the best of our knowledge, the papers that study indeterminacy in the open economy are
Lahiri (2001), Weder (2001), Meng and Velasco (2004) and ACW (2005, 2007 and 2008). Unlike this
paper, Lahiri, Weder, and Meng and Velasco are concerned with multiple equilibria in the economy
that uses capital and labor as inputs. Only ACW extend the Benhabib-Farmer model to an open
economy by introducing imported foreign factors as a third production input. But their model
relies on decreasing marginal costs (or increasing returns), as in Lahiri (2001) and Weder (2001),
to generate indeterminacy. Although Meng and Velasco analyze the e¤ects of distortionary factor
taxation in generating indeterminacy, none of them explores the mechanism for indeterminacy due
to the presence of scal increasing returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider a standard neo-
classical growth model that incorporates foreign energy as a third production factor. The energy
price is assumed to be set in the world markets and taken as given. In this setup, we prove our key
results: (1) the model may exhibit local indeterminacy and sunspots when tari¤ rates are endoge-
nously determined by a balanced-budget rule with a constant level of government expenditures (or
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lump-sum transfers); and (2) indeterminacy disappears if the government nances endogenous public
spending and transfers with xed tari¤ rates. In section 3, we compare this model with Benhabib
and Farmer, SGU and ACW models and nd that (1) the indeterminacy condition in our model
has a close correspondence with the one obtained in the increasing returns model of Benhabib and
Farmer (1994); (2) if the imported factor is mainly a labor substitute, indeterminacy may not easily
arise; and (3) the larger the imported energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be
subject to multiple equilibria. In section 4, we discuss the robustness of our indeterminacy result
and in section 5, we conclude the paper.
2. An Economy with Tari¤s
This paper incorporates two di¤erent formulations of the government budget constraints into a
standard neoclassical growth model that incorporates foreign energy as a third production factor. We
assume that labor is indivisible (as in Hansen (1985)) and the only source of government revenue is a
tari¤. In particular, the balanced-budget rule consists of exogenous (and/or endogenous) government
purchases (and/or transfers), and endogenous (and/or exogenous) tari¤ rates levied on the imported
input.
2.1. Firms
We introduce government tari¤ policy into the continuous time framework of ACW without pro-
ductive externalities.8 There is a continuum of identical competitive rms with the total number
normalized to one. The single good is produced by the representative rm with constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function
8Without productive externalities, the model of ACW is identical to the standard neoclassical growth model that
imports oil as a third productive input.
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yt = k
ak
t n
an
t o
a0
t , (1)
where yt is total output, kt is the aggregate stock of capital, nt is the aggregate labor supply,
ak+an+a0 = 1 and the third factor in the production, say oil (ot), is imported.9 Perfect competition
in factor and product markets implies that factor demands are given by
wt = an
yt
nt
; (2)
rt +  = ak
yt
kt
, (3)
and
po(1 +  t) = a0
yt
ot
, (4)
where (rt + ) denotes the user cost of renting capital, wt denotes the real wage, po denotes the real
price of oil (the imported goods) and  t is the tari¤ rate levied on the imported oil and uniform
to all rms.10 Here we should emphasize that (1) po is the relative price of the foreign input in
terms of the single good, which is the numeraire and tradable; and (2) the variable  t represents the
endogenous (or exogenous) tari¤ rate levied on the foreign input and we require that  t  0 to rule
out the existence of import subsidies.11
Since we assume that the economy is open to importing energy (oil), the agent can use the
tradable good to buy the foreign input. The energy price is assumed to be exogenous and the foreign
input is assumed to be perfectly elastically supplied.12 These imply that the energy price, po, is
9The third inputs can be non-reproducible natural resources.
10 2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate of capital and rt the rental rate of capital.
11 If tari¤ rates are exogenous,  t =  holds for all t.
12The model is based on the standard DSGE models that incorporate foreign energy as a third production factor.
This class of models have been used widely to study the business-cycle e¤ects of oil price shocks. This literature includes
Finn (2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Wei (2003), and ACW (2005, 2007, and 2008).
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independent of the factor demand for ot. Hence by substituting out ot in the production function
using ot = a0
yt
po(1+ t)
, we can obtain the following reduced-form production function
yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t . (5)
Here the term At = ( a0p0(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 acts as the "technology coe¢ cient" in a neoclassical growth model,
which is inversely related to the foreign factor price and  t. In this reduced-form production function,
the "e¤ective returns to scale" is measured by
ak + an
1  a0 = 1. (6)
2.2. Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical innitely-lived households, each endowed
with one unit of time and maximizes the intertemporal utility function
Z 1
0
e t(log ct   bnt)dt, b > 0, (7)
where ct and nt are the individual households consumption and hours worked, and  2 (0; 1) is the
subjective discount rate. We assume that there are no intrinsic uncertainties present in the model.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is given by
:
kt = rtkt + wtnt   ct + Tt, k0 > 0 given, (8)
where
:
kt denotes net investment and Tt  0 is the lump-sum transfers.
The rst order conditions for the households problem are
8
1ct
= t, (9)
b = twt, (10)
:
t = (  rt)t, (11)
where t denotes the marginal utility of income.
2.3. Government
The government chooses the tari¤/transfer policy f t; Ttg, and balances its budget in each period.
At each point in time, the budget constraint of the government can be stated as follows
po tot =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
= Gt + Tt, (12)
where Gt  0 represents government expenditures. Finally, market clearing requires that aggregate
demand equal aggregate supply
ct +Gt +
:
kt + kt + otp
o = yt. (13)
Note that the international trade balance is always zero. Foreigners are paid in goods. This is
clear in the above equation, according to which domestic production is divided between consumption,
investment, imports and government expenditures (ct +it +poot + Gt = yt, it =
:
kt + kt). So part
of what is produced domestically is used to pay for the imports. This is the interpretation of Finn
(2000), Wei (2003) and ACW (2005 and 2008).
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2.4. Analysis of the model dynamics
As in GH (2004), we assume that tari¤ revenues can be either consumed by the government (i.e.
Gt  0 for all t) or returned to households as transfers (i.e., Tt  0, for all t). It is easy to verify that
the economy in which the government nances endogenous public spending and/or transfers with
xed tari¤ rates is immune to indeterminacy. That is due to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the tari¤ rate is exogenous, production doesnt exhibit increasing returns to scale
since At term is a constant for all t. (In this case, government expenditures are endogenous under
the balanced budget rule.) Therefore, the economy exhibits saddle path stability, regardless of the
existence of lump-sum transfers.
GH prove that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, if the government nances
endogenous public spending and transfers with xed income tax rates, a one-sector real business cycle
model exhibits determinacy, regardless of the existence of lump-sum transfers. In this model, we have
the same result. Once we x the tari¤ rate (or oil tax rate) like Miguel and Manzano (2006), the
model doesnt display increasing returns to scale, so indeterminacy cannot arise.
To remain comparable with SGUs analysis, we focus on the cases where the government either
consumes all tari¤ revenues (i.e., Tt = 0) or transfers the revenue to the household in a lump-sum
way (i.e., Gt = 0). In the following sections, we mainly discuss the case where Tt = 0 holds for all t.
(In section 2.6, we extend the basic model to consider the case where Gt = 0 holds for all t.) Under
this specic assumption Tt = 0, we replace the consumption with 1t and transform wage rate and
rental rate into functions of capital and labor, then the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to the
following ve equations
b = tanAtk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t , (14)
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:
t
t
= +    akAtk
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t , (15)
:
kt = (1  a0
1 +  t
)yt   kt   1
t
 Gt, (16)
Gt =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
, (17)
and
yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t . (18)
First we claim that for a given tari¤ rate (i.e.,  t =  , for all t), the dynamical system possesses
a unique interior steady state.
Lemma 1. The dynamical system possesses a unique interior steady state when the government
consumes all tari¤ revenues and the tari¤ rate is exogenous, i.e.,  t =  , for all t. (In this case,
At( t) = A() holds for all t.)
Proof. To nd such a steady state, set
:
t in (15) equal to zero. We can solve the capital/labor ratio
in the steady state, which is not independent of the tari¤ rate. ( kn)ss = (
+
akA()
)
1 a0
 an is unique for
the given tari¤ rate. Equation (14) can be solved for a unique and positive value of  in the steady
state, i.e., ss = banA()(
+
akA()
)ak=an . Using this value of , the government budget constraint (17),
and the fact that in the steady state
:
kt = 0, we can write the market-clearing condition (16) as
(1  a0)kss[A()(k
n
)
 an
1 a0
ss   ] = anA()
b
[
+ 
akA()
] ak=an . ((kss))
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Since ( kn)ss is known given the tari¤ rate, we can nd that kss (the steady state value of the capital
stock) is unique and positive. Because both the capital stock and the capital/labor ratio are positive
and unique in the steady state, nss (the steady state value of the labor supply) is also positive and
unique. Finally, the steady state level of government purchases given by (17) is also unique and can
be written as
Gss =

1 + 
a0A()kss(
k
n
)
  an
1 a0
ss , ((g))
where kss is the solution to (kss) equation. It is clear that Gss is continuous in  .
It follows from (kss) and (g) that when  is equal to zero, Gss is also equal to zero because kss is
in this case positive and nite. If the tari¤ rate is exogenous, we can prove that there exists a unique
tari¤ rate that maximizes Gss. It is m = ana0 .
Secondly, for a given level of government expenditures, there is a (steady-state) La¤er curve-type
relationship between the tari¤ rate and tari¤ revenue, which means that the number of steady state
tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance the pre-set level of government purchases will be
general either 0 or 2. We prove it in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When tari¤rates are endogenously determined by a balanced-budget rule with a constant
level of government expenditures, the steady state in the dynamical system which consists of (14)-
(18) may exist and the number of steady state tari¤ rates ( ss) that generate enough revenue to
nance the pre-set level of government purchases will be general either 0 or 2. If there are two steady
states in the model, we only focus on the steady state associated with the low steady state tari¤ rate
since the steady state associated with the high steady state tari¤ rate is always determinate.
Proof. We derive the steady state values of these variables kn = (
+
akA(ss)
)
1 a0
 an ,  = banA(ss)(
+
akA(ss)
)
ak
an
and k =
anA(ss)
b
( +
akA(ss)
)
  akan
[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] , where A( ss) denotes the steady state value of At as  t is equal to
its steady state value  ss. We also nd that in the steady state, G = ss
(1+ss)
an+a0
an
constant= F ( ss)
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holds and the constant is
(
a0
po
)
a0
an a0(+)an(
+
ak
)
  akan
akb[
1 a0
ak
(+) ] . It is clear that F ( ss) is non-monotone and the
number of positive steady state tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance a pre-set level of
government purchases will be general either 0 or 2.
The second interesting nding is that if  is exogenous as in the above lemma, @Gss@ = 0 implies
that there exists a unique exogenous tari¤ rate that maximizes Gss. Its value is ana0 . This is due to
the fact that Gss is equal to 
(1+)
an+a0
an
constant.
In the third step, we show that when the government expenditures are exogenous, the tari¤ rate
is countercyclical with respect to the tax base or the output under the balanced budget rule. The
following proposition is the key to indeterminacy in this model.
Proposition 2. If the government expenditures are exogenous, the tari¤ rate is regressive with
respect to the tax base (poot), or the output under the balanced budget rule, i.e. @ t@yt < 0.
13 The
regressive (countercyclical) tari¤ rate (@ t@yt < 0) can induce increasing returns to scale with respect
13This relation doesnt violate the evidence of a negative relationship between tari¤s and growth, especially among
the worlds richest countries like those in EU, which is documented by Dejong and Ripoll (2005).
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to capital and labor.
Proof. po tot =  ta0yt(1+ t) = G implies that
@ t
@yt
< 0. Considering the log-linearization of the following
equations around the steady state G =  ta0yt(1+ t) , At = (
a0
p0(1+ t)
)
a0
1 a0 , and yt = Atk
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0
t , it is easy
to verify that
^
yt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt +
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
nt.14 This means that production exhibits increasing
returns to scale with respect to capital and labor, i.e., ak+an1 a0(1+ss) > 1. Thus, an endogenous tari¤
rate could be a source of scal increasing returns.
GH illustrate that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribes indeterminacy result depends on a balanced-budget requirement whereby the tax rate de-
creases with the households taxable income. In this model, we get a similar result that requires the
countercyclical rate to generate indeterminacy.15
To facilitate the analysis of the model dynamics, we consider the log linear approximation of the
equilibrium conditions around the steady state. Let t,
^
kt,
^
 t and
^
nt denote the log deviations of t,
kt,  t and nt from their respective steady states. The log linearized equilibrium conditions then are
0 = t    ss
^
 t
1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
+
ak
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt), (19)
:
t = (+ )[
an
1  a0 (
^
kt   ^nt) +  ss
^
 t
1 a0
a0
(1 +  ss)
], (20)
14Log-linearizing equation G = ta0yt
(1+t)
around the steady state, we have (G  a0yss) ^ t = a0yss ^yt and G = ssa0yss(1+ss) ,
where
^
 t and
^
yt denote the log deviations of  t and yt from their respective steady states (i.e., ss and yss). Combining
these two equations yields
^
yt =   11+ss
^
 t. At = ( a0p0(1+t) )
a0
1 a0 implies that
^
At =   ss
^
t
1 a0
a0
(1+ss)
. Log-linearizing the
production function implies that
^
yt =
^
At +
ak
1 a0
^
kt +
an
1 a0
^
nt. It is straightforward to see that
^
yt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt +
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
nt.
15We think that the progressive tari¤ rate may make the economy against the sunspots in ACW model.
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:
^
kt = [(1  a0) (+ )
1  a0(1 +  ss)   ]
^
kt +
an(+ )(1  a0)
ak[1  a0(1 +  ss)]
^
nt + [  + (1  a0)
ak
(+ )]t, (21)
and
^
yt =  
1
1 +  ss
^
 t =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
an
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt. (22)
Combining (19) and (22) yields
^
nt =
t
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
+
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
ak
1 a0   ss1 a0
a0
an
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt.
Using this expression to eliminate the
^
ntin (20) and (21) results in the following system of di¤erential
equations
2664
:
t
:
^
kt
3775 =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775
2664 t^
kt
3775 and J =
2664 J11 J12
J21 J22
3775 , (23)
where J11 =  ( + ) anak a0ss , J22 = ( + )
1 a0
ak a0ss   , J12 = ( + )
 ssa0
ak a0ss and J21 = ( +
) (1 a0)ak
1 (ss+1)a0
ak a0ss   . We can then compute the Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (23)
evaluated at the steady state. The trace and the determinant of the Jacobian are stated as follows
trace(J) =
ak
ak   a0 ss (+ )  , (24)
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det(J) =
(+ )
ak   a0 ss f(an   a0 ss) 
(+ )
ak   a0 ss [an(1  a0)  a0 ss
1  a0
ak
(1  a0(1 +  ss))]g. (25)
Proposition 3. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the indeterminacy of the equilibrium is
J11 + J22 = trace(J) < 0 < J22J11   J12J21 = det(J), or, aka0 <  ss < ana0 .
Notice that since the dynamical system contains one predetermined variable, kt, the equilibrium
is indeterminate if and only if both eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real parts.
It is equivalent to requiring that the determinant be positive and the trace negative. It is easy to
verify that, trace(J) = akak a0ss ( + )    < 0 if and only if  ss >
ak
a0
. If the trace condition is
satised, the term (+)ak a0ss on the right side of the determinant is negative. det(J) > 0 if and only if
G( ss) = [
(+)a20(1 a0)
ak
 a20]2ss  ss[ (+)a0(1 a0)
2
ak
 a0(1 a0)]+[(+)an(1 a0) anak] < 0. It is
easy to show G(aka0 ) = 0 and G(0) > 0. Then the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium
indeterminacy is equivalent to G < 0, or, aka0 <  ss < 
 where  = [(+)an(1 a0) anak][(+)a0(1 a0) a0ak] =
an
a0
> aka0 .
A su¢ cient condition for the set of tari¤ rates satisfying the necessary and su¢ cient condition to
be nonempty is that the labor share is larger than the capital share (i.e., an > ak). For steady-state
tari¤ rates smaller than aka0 or greater than
an
a0
, the determinant of J is negative and therefore the
equilibrium is locally determinate. It should be emphasized that SGU show that the revenue maxi-
mizing tax rate is the least upper bound of the set of taxes rate for which the rational expectations
equilibrium is indeterminate, this property also holds in our case.
The intuition behind the indeterminacy result is quite straightforward. Suppose that agents
expect future tari¤ rates to increase. This implies that, for any given capital stock, future oil
imports and the rate of return on capital will be lower (the latter is due to the fact that the marginal
product of capital is increasing in the oil input). The decrease in the expected rate of return on
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capital, in turn, lowers the current oil demand, leading the current output decrease. Since the tari¤
rate is countercyclical @ t@yt < 0, budget balance can cause the current tari¤ rate to increase, thus
validating agents initial expectations. (For certain choices of the parameter values, namely those
satisfying aka0 <  ss <
an
a0
, the expectation of an above steady state tari¤ rate in the next period leads
to an increase in tari¤ rates today that is larger than the one expected for next period.)
To help understand the intuition, consider the consumption Euler equation (in discrete time for
ease of interpretation) as follows:
ct+1
ct
= (1   + ak yt+1
kt+1
) = [1   + (1 +  t+1) 
a0
1 a0 rbtt+1], (26)
where  denotes the discount factor, rbtt+1 = ak(
a0
p0
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t+1 n
an
1 a0
t+1 the before-tari¤ return on
capital and  t+1 the tari¤ rate in period (t + 1). Householdsoptimistic expectations that lead to
higher investment raise the left hand side of this equation, but result in a lower before-tari¤ return
on capital rbtt+1 due to the diminishing marginal products. The countercyclical tari¤ rate can increase
the right hand side of the equation, thus validating the initial optimistic expectations. If the tari¤
rate is a constant under the balanced budget rule with endogenous public spending and/or transfers,
the righthand side of (26) falls. As a consequence, indeterminacy cannot arise in this specication,
regardless of the details of the governments tari¤ policies.
Capital accumulation is crucial in generating indeterminacy in this economy. One can easily
show that in the absence of capital accumulation, the equilibrium is determinate. The reason is that
without capital, (14) becomes b=t = an( a0po(1+ t))
a0
1 a0 , (16) becomes 1=t = (1   a01+ t )yt  G, and
(17) becomes G=nt =  t( 1po )
a0
1 a0 ( a01+ t )
1
an . These three equations yield locally unique solutions for
 t, nt, and t.
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2.5. Calibrated Examples
In this section, following SGU (1997) and ACW (2005), we calibrate the model using structural
parameters that are found in the real business cycle literature. The values used are 0:7 for the labor
share (an), 0:21 for the enery share (ao), 0:09 for the capital share (ak), 0:1 for the annual depreciation
rate () and 0:04 for the annual real interest rate ().16 Assuming that the steady state tari¤ rate
in the country for oil import is 0:6 ( ss), it is easy to nd that the two roots of the Jacobian matrix
are ( 0:2250 1:5714i), which indicates that indeterminacy in this case arises. The high tari¤ rate
(0:6) is estimated using the result of Newbery (2005) and consistent with the empirical data in those
EU countries (especially in year 2002).17
Next, we consider the energy tax policy that is implemented in most of European countries. As
the optimal tari¤ argument, the energy taxes are relatively high in some European countries.18 For
instance, oil is heavily taxed in Denmark, the e¤ective tax rate on domestic fuels exceeds 0.8. We
calibrate the models structural parameters following SGU (1997) and ACW (2005). Namely, we set
the time period in the model to be one year, as in SGU (1997, section III), the annual real interest
rate  = 0:04, the capital share in Denmark ak = 0:1, the labor share in Denmark an = 0:7, the
annual depreciation rate  = 0:1. The steady state oil tax rate ( ss = 0:8) in Denmark falls inside
the range of values for which the equilibrium is indeterminate.19
In a short note, Chen and Zhang (2008) introduce intrinsic uncertainty in the form of exogenous
productivity and government purchases shocks into the discrete time version of this model and
16 In this numerical calibration example, following ACW (2005), we set a0 to be 0:21 which is the cost share of foreign
inputs in domestic production in Netherlands. an is 0:7 which is the cost share of labor input in domestic production
in Netherlands. Other parameter values are taken from SGU (1997, section III).
17 import tari¤
import price =
15:6$=bbl
26$=bbl
= 0:6 is the optimal tari¤ rate of oil from Newbery (2005, section 3.1). One issue should
be pointed out. As in SGU, if the only source of government revenues is a tax on consumption, the model will exhibit
local determinacy when consumption tax rates are endogenously determined by a balanced-budget rule with a constant
level of government revenues.
18The energy tax revenue is overwhelmingly oil tax revenue in some EU countries, see Newbery (2005).
19The parameter values of ak and an are taken from ACW (2005). The values of  and  are taken from SGU (1997).
The steady state tax rate is from Newbery (2005). Indeterminacy arises since two roots are 0:1667 1:1213i.
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investigate the propagation mechanism of sunspot and fundamental shocks under various assumptions
about their correlation. Following SGU (1997, section IV), we calibrate the model and compute the
impulse responses assuming that the time unit is a quarter, the steady state tari¤ rate is 0.6, the
serial correlation of two fundamental shocks is 0.9, the discount rate is 0.99, the depreciation rate
is 0.025, and the remaining parameters take the same values as in the rst numerical case. For this
calibration of the model, we nd that (1) under indeterminacy, the impulse responses of tari¤ rates,
output, and hours to sunspot, technology and government purchases shocks are hump-shaped and
highly persistent; and (2) neither the rst-order serial correlations, the contemporaneous correlations
with output, nor the standard deviation relative to output of tari¤s, output, hours, and consumption
is a¤ected by the relative volatility of the sunspot shock or its correlation with the fundamental
shock. Therefore it validates the equivalence between factor income taxes and tari¤s, in the sense
that they share similar propagation mechanisms of sunspot and fundamental shocks.
2.6. Extending the model
In this section, we extend the basic model to consider the case where Gt = 0 and Tt =constant hold
for all t. We demonstrate that considering a constant level of lump-sum transfers does not alter my
main result, and a similar condition to that obtained in proposition 3 on the endogenous tari¤ rates
is all that is needed for indeterminacy.
Assume that the government collects the revenue and makes a lump-sum transfer to the agent.
Considering the (new) equilibrium conditions for the optimization problem, we note that (1) Eqs.
(14)(15) as well as (18) remain unchanged; and (2) Eqs. (16) and (17) have to be slightly modied:
:
kt = (1  a0
1 +  t
)yt   kt   1
t
, (16)
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T =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
. (17)
As in lemma 2 and proposition 2, we can easily prove that (1) the steady state in the dynamical
system which consists of (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18) may exist and the number of steady state
tari¤ rates that generate enough revenue to nance a given level of lump-sum transfers will be general
either 0 or 2; and (2) if the lump-sum transfers are exogenous, the tari¤ rate is regressive with respect
to the tax base (poot), or the output under the balanced budget rule. Using the same method as
given in the above sections, we can derive the Jacobian matrix J . In this case, four elements in J
can be stated as follows J11 =  (+ ) anak a0ss , J22 = (+ )
1 a0
ak a0ss   , J12 = (+ )
 ssa0
ak a0ss and
J21 =
(+)
ak
(1 a0)2+ss[(1 a0)2 ana0] 2ssa0
(ak a0ss)(ss+1)   . The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the model
to exhibit indeterminacy is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium is indeterminate if and only if 2 <  ss < 3 holds where aka0 <
2 < 3. 2 and 3 are two positive roots of the polynomial G( ss) = 13ss +2
2
ss +3 ss +4,
where 1 = a20[   (+)ak ] < 0, 2 =  a0an + a0f
(+)[(1 a0)2 ana0]
ak
+ a0   akg, 3 =  a0an +
[ (+ )an(1  a0) + anak] +a0 (+)ak (1  a0)2   ak, and 4 =  (+ )an(1  a0) + anak.20
In this case, we cannot explicitly derive the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the balanced
budget rule to generate indeterminacy. That is because relaxing the assumptions of public spending
will make the determinant of the Jacobian matrix become more complicated, up to a third order
polynomial. But our indeterminacy result is robust to this extension. Here we provide a numerical
example to validate it.
Example 1. The purpose of this example is to illustrate the main result of the propositionthat
indeterminacy in fact occurs with the empirical tari¤ rateby one numerical experiment. We adopt
20See Zhang (2008b) for a detailed discussion of this proposition.
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the parameter values as in the rst numerical case, i.e., a0 = 0:21, an = 0:7, ak = 0:09,  = 0:1, and
 = 0:04. We draw the graph of G(t) for the numerical experiment and nd that the negative root
of G( ss) is 1 =  0:9196, aka0 = 0:4286 < 2 = 0:4440, and 3 = 2:7138. As 2 <  ss = 0:6 < 3,
indeterminacy arises.
3. Comparison with Benhabib and Farmer, SGU and ACW Models
In this section, we rst show that there exists a close correspondence between the indeterminacy
condition of the model with endogenous tari¤ rates and constant government purchases presented
in this paper and that of the increasing returns model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994). That is,
the necessary condition for local indeterminacy is that the "equilibrium labor demand schedule" can
be upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply schedule. Unlike the model of Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), this model doesnt rely on increasing returns in production to make the "equilibrium
labor demand schedule" upward sloping. In fact, the equilibrium labor demand schedule in our model
is upward sloping because increases in the aggregate employment are accompanied by decreases in
the tari¤ rate and increases in the after-tari¤ return on labor. The after-tari¤ labor demand function
21
can be stated as follows (in log deviations from the steady state)
^
wt =
ak
1  a0
^
kt   ak
1  a0
^
nt   a0
1  a0
 ss
1 +  ss
^
 t, (27)
where
^
wt =
^bt
wt   a01 a0 ss1+ss
^
 t denotes the log deviation of the after-tari¤ wage rate from the steady
state.21 The rms labor demand schedule is decreasing in
^
nt. However, when we replace
^
 t with
^
kt
and
^
nt using the balanced-budget equation (22), it is easy to obtain the equilibrium labor demand
schedule:
^
wt =
ak
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
kt +
 (ak   a0 ss)
1  a0(1 +  ss)
^
nt. (28)
As aka0 <  ss <
an
a0
, the equilibrium labor demand function is upward sloping since  (ak a0ss)1 a0(1+ss) > 0.
Because in our case
^
wt =
^
ct, the aggregate labor supply is innitely elastic (for a given tari¤ rate
and marginal utility of income), the labor demand schedule will be steeper than the labor supply
schedule whenever aka0 <  ss <
an
a0
. It is worth emphasizing that our economy can be easily shown
to be equivalent to SGU model since in both cases, the price-to-cost markup is countercyclical with
respect to the output, which in turn gives rise to indeterminacy (see the appendix).
Secondly, we compare our model with SGU model. SGU prove that within a standard neoclassical
growth model, a balanced budget rule can make expectations of higher tax rates self fullling if the
scal authority relies on changes in labor income taxes to eliminate the short run scal imbalances.
One may think if the import factor is a labor substitute, the endogenous tari¤ rate levied on the
imported oil will make indeterminacy arise more easily. Although in the above sections, we follow
ACW to assume that the imported factor is mainly a substitue for capital, we can not eliminate the
possibility that imported factor is a substitute for labor.
21Here
^bt
wt denotes the log deviation of the before-tari¤ wage rate from the steady state.
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We get the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If we assume that the imported factor is mainly a labor substitute instead of a
capital substitute, which means that we x ak at a given level (say, ak = 0:3) and let a0 vary in the
interval (0; 1 ak an),22 indeterminacy may not easily arise under the labor substitute assumption.
Proof. A formal proof can be stated as follows. Consider an economy with capital share (a) and labor
share (1 a). When we introduce into the model the foreign input with share b as a labor substitute,
the indeterminacy region becomes ab <  ss <
1 a b
b . When we introduce into the model the foreign
input with share b as a capital substitute, the indeterminacy region becomes a bb <  ss <
1 a
b . It
is clear that the lower bound of the region under the labor substitute assumption is larger than the
one obtained under the capital substitute assumption.
From this proposition, we nd that although tari¤s share with factor income taxes the similar
mechanism for indeterminacy, they have di¤erent implications in generating indeterminacy. That is,
the "equivalence" relationship between them only holds through scal increasing returns by endoge-
nizing rates and making the government spending exogenous. ACW nd that if the imported factor
is a substitute for labor, a larger oil share (a0) implies a smaller threshold value of the production
externality although the reduction of externality is less dramatic. Here we nd that for the same
oil share (a0), under the labor substitute assumption, the threshold value of the (steady state) tari¤
rate needed to generate indeterminacy (i.e., the lower bound of the indeterminacy region) can be
larger than that obtained under the capital substitute assumption. In the numerical calibration
example of Chen and Zhang (2008), we assume that the time unit is a quarter, the capital share is
0.09 (i.e., ak = 0:09), the oil share is 0.21 (i.e., ao = 0:21), the labor share is 0.7 (i.e., an = 0:7), the
depreciation rate is 0.025 (i.e.,  = 0:025), the discount rate in the discrete time version of this model
22Under the capital substitute assumption, we x an at a given level and let a0 vary in the interval (0; 1  ak   an).
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is 0.99 (i.e.,  = 0:99) and the steady state oil tax rate is 0.6 (i.e.,  ss = 0:6).23 Indeterminacy in
this case arises. By contrast, if we assume that the imported oil is a labor substitute, indeterminacy
will disappear. That is because indeterminacy would require that the steady state tari¤ rate be at
least 10=7 under the labor substitute assumption (i.e., ak = 0:3, a0 = 0:21, and an = 0:49). But it
is empirically unrealistic.
The economic intuition behind this result can be shown by considering the equilibrium condition
in the labor market. Suppose that expectations of a future tari¤ increase shift the labor supply
schedule up (since the rm will import more oil today to produce more output). Because the slope
of the labor demand schedule is equal to   ak1 a0 , the absolute value of the slope under the capital
substitute assumption (j   a b1 b j = a b1 b ) is smaller than that obtained under the labor substitute
assumption (j  a1 b j = a1 b). This implies that the decline in employment under the capital substitute
assumption should be larger than that obtained under the labor substitute assumption. As a result,
the increase in the tari¤ rate required to bring about budget balance under the capital substitute
assumption should be larger than that obtained under the labor substitute assumption. Hence
multiple equilibria become more likely to occur under the capital substitute assumption than under
the labor substitute assumption.
Thirdly, we compare our model with ACW model. ACW show that heavy reliance on imported
energy can have a signicant e¤ect on economic instability in the presence of increasing returns to
scale: the larger the imported energy share in GDP, the easier it is for the economy to be subject to
multiple equilibria. We have the similar proposition below:
Proposition 6. We x an at a given level (say, an = 0:7), which implies that the imported input is
a capital substitute (i.e., ak + a0 = (1  an) is xed). The larger the imported energy share in GDP,
the easier it is for the economy to be subject to multiple equilibria. Because the lower bound of the
23The country in this case is Netherland and we assume that the foreign input is a capital substitute.
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indeterminacy region aka0 <  ss <
an
a0
decreases as a0 increases, indeterminacy is easier to arise in the
range of empirical tari¤ rates the larger a0 is.
As a0 decreases, the minimum tari¤ rate that generates indeterminacy increases (given that an is
xed). The intuition can also be shown by considering the equilibrium condition in the labor market.
Suppose that expectations of a future tari¤ increase shift the labor supply schedule up. Because the
slope of the labor demand schedule is equal to   ak1 a0 =   11+anak , the smaller ak is (given that an is
xed), the larger the decline in employment (since the slope of the labor demand schedule decreases
in absolute value as ak decreases). As a consequence, the increase in the tari¤ rate required to bring
about budget balance is larger the smaller ak is or the larger a0 is, and hence multiple equilibria
become more likely the larger a0 is.
4. Robustness
In this section, we briey discuss the robustness of our indeterminacy result in the economy with
endogenously determined tari¤ rates. Specically, we allow for income-elastic government spending
and more general preferences.24 First, we consider the tari¤ policy, where government expenditures
are income elastic and tari¤ rates adjust in equal proportions to balance the budget in each period.
Assuming that the key parameter values are taken from the rst calibrated example, we calculate
the smallest value of  for which indeterminacy arises for a given value of the income elasticity of
government expenditures, "GY .25 As in SGU, we consider that government expenditures can be
procyclical ("GY = 0:5), acyclical ("GY = 0) and countercyclical ("GY =  0:5). And we nd that
the smallest tari¤ rate that makes indeterminacy occur increases from 42.86 to 85.71 percent as "GY
increases from zero to 0:5. Therefore we conclude that the more procyclical government expenditures
24As Jess Benhabib suggested to me, tari¤s and factor income taxes are very close to each other in nature. Tari¤s
can inherit many characteristics of factor income taxes in the SGU model. So the method that we can use to analyze
how public debt and predetermined tax rates a¤ect indeterminacy will be essentially the same as in SGU (1997).
25We assume that an = 0:7, a0 = 0:21, ak = 0:09,  = 0:04 and  = 0:1.
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are, the less likely it is that indeterminacy arises. That is because GtYt =
a0
1+ 1
t
(the budget balance)
implies that the more procyclical government expenditures are, the smaller the required change
in tari¤ rates necessary to balance the budget for a given change in output, the less likely it is
that indeterminacy arises. If we consider the special case in which government expenditures are a
xed proportion of output ("GY = 1) and are nanced by a tari¤, the budget balance implies a
constant tari¤ rate and hence the model is determinate. If we allow government expenditures to be
countercyclical, the smallest tari¤ rate that makes indeterminacy occur decreases from 42.86 to 28.57
percent as "GY decreases from zero to  0:5. In other words, the more countercyclical government
expenditures are, the more likely it is that indeterminacy arises.26
Secondly, we claim that the larger the share of public expenditures nanced by tari¤s, the more
likely it is that indeterminacy arises. In section 2.6, we show that if Tt =
 ta0yt
(1+ t)
is exogenous (i.e.,
Gt = 0 the public expenditures nanced by tari¤s are zero), indeterminacy still arises but the lower
bound of the indeterminacy region increases.27
Thirdly, we can consider the general period utility function U(ct; nt) = log ct  n
1+
t
1+ (  0), which
implies less than perfectly elastic aggregate labor supply. In this case, the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply with respect to wage is equal to 1=. For a given value of the Frisch wage elasticity of labor
supply ( can be 18 ,
1
16 and
1
32), we calculate the smallest tari¤ rate that makes indeterminacy possible
under the balanced budget rule with a pre-set level of government expenditures ( lower boundss will be
0:7989, 0:6246 and 0:5296 respectively).28 And we nd that the smallest tari¤ rate that generates
26 It is easy to nd that once we consider the income elasticity of government expenditures, four elements in the
Jacobian matrix will become J11 =   an(+)ak+a0("GY  1)ss , J22 =
(1 a0)(+)
ak+a0("GY  1)ss   , J12 =
a0ss("GY  1)(+)
ak+a0("GY  1)ss and
J21 =
(1 a0)(+)
ak
1 a0+a0("GY  1)ss
ak+a0("GY  1)ss   . The lower and upper bounds of the steady state tari¤ rate for indeterminacy
are ak
a0(1 "GY ) and
an
a0(1 "GY ) .
27 In order to remain comparable with SGUs analysis, we only consider two cases: Tt = 0 and Gt = 0.
28We assume that an = 0:7, a0 = 0:21, ak = 0:09,  = 0:04 and  = 0:1. If we set  to be 1, 1/2 and 1/4
as in SGU, we nd that the model is indeterminate if the minimal values of the steady state tari¤ rate are 2.095,
1.540 and 1.095 respectively. It is easy to prove that four elements in the Jacobian matrix in this case are J11 =
  an(+)
ak a0ss+[1 a0(1+ss)] , J22 =
(1 a0)(+)(1+)
ak a0ss+[1 a0(1+ss)]   , J12 =
(+)
1 a0(1+ss)
h
an[1 a0(1+ss)] a0anss
ak a0ss+[1 a0(1+ss)]   a0ss
i
and
J21 =
(1 a0)(+)
ak
(1+)[1 a0(1+ss)]
ak a0ss+[1 a0(1+ss)]   . The lower and upper bounds of the indeterminacy region are
ak+(1 a0)
a0(1+)
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indeterminacy is decreasing with respect to 1=. We can analyze the relationship by considering the
equilibrium condition in the labor market. The slope of the labor supply curve is , so employment
falls by more the smaller  is when expectations of a future tari¤ increase shift the labor supply
curve up. As a result, the increase in the tari¤ rate needed to balance the budget is greater, the
smaller  is, and hence multiple equilibria become more likely the smaller  is or the larger the wage
elasticy of labor supply is.29
The numerical result shows that if the Frisch labor supply elasticity is less than or equal to 4,
the smallest tari¤ rate for indeterminacy is empirically unrealistic. In order to make indeterminacy
possible, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply should be su¢ ciently high. We conjecture that once
we introduce a nontaxed sector (such as home production) into the model, the balanced-budget rule
may induce indeterminacy under realistic tari¤ rates and labor supply elasticities.
5. Conclusion
We explore the "channel equivalence" between factor income taxes and tari¤s to generate indeter-
minacy. The channel is through scal increasing returns by endogenizing rates and making the
government spending (or lump-sum transfers) exogenous. We show that, in the presence of scal
increasing returns caused by endogenous tari¤s, it is easy for indeterminacy to occur in small open
economies that import foreign energy and take as given the international energy price. The required
steady state tari¤ rates can be empirically realistic. An implication of this paper is that economies
largely dependent on non-reproducible natural resources may be vulnerable to sunspot uctuations
if the government nances public spending with endogenous energy taxes.
and an=a0. The restriction on  is an > ak (1 + ).
29 In this case, the labor supply schedule is
^
wt =
^
ct + 
^
nt and the equilibrium labor demand schedule is
^
wt =
ak
1 a0(1+ss)
^
kt +
 (ak a0ss)
1 a0(1+ss)
^
n. From (28), we can see that the slope of the equilibrium labor demand schedule is
increasing in ss. As 1 decreases, the slope of the labor supply curve increases; therefore, as
1

decreases, the steady
state tari¤ rate has to increase in order for the labor demand curve to be steeper than the labor supply curve.
27
One future direction is to see under what circumstances, tari¤s and capital income taxes are
equivalent in generating indeterminacy since the essential element for indeterminacy in SGU model
is the endogenous labor income tax rate.
6. Appendix:
We summarize the equilibrium conditions of the model with a balanced-budget rule, endogenous
tari¤ rates, and constant government purchases presented in this paper. Consider the discrete time
case of a tari¤. The balanced-budget rule is given by
G =
 ta0yt
(1 +  t)
.
The following equilibrium conditions hold for all t,
Uc(ct; nt) = t,
Un(ct; nt) = wtt,
Yt = ct + kt+1   (1  )kt,
and
1 = 
t+1
t
(1   + rt+1),
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constaint of the agent. In this model, disposable
income, Yt; is given by
28
Yt = (1  a0)yt = yt   p0ot  G,
G represents a xed cost that ensures that rms do not make pure prots in the long run (given that
the foreign rms take away their payments). The after-tari¤ wage rate wt, and the after-tari¤ rental
rate rt are given by
rbtt = ak(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0 1
t n
an
1 a0
t = trt,
and
wbtt = an(
a0
po
)
a0
1 a0 k
ak
1 a0
t n
an
1 a0 1
t = twt,
where rbtt and w
bt
t denote the before-tari¤ rental rate and before-tari¤ wage rate respectively. In the
balanced budget model, t represents the wedge between marginal product and after tari¤ factor
prices introduced by endogenous tari¤s. It is easy to verify that the markup t is countercyclical
with respect to yt since
t = (1 +  t)
a0
1 a0 = (1  1  a0
a0
G
Yt
)
  a0
1 a0 = (
G
Yt
).
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